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In conclusion, an argument can be made, based on historical, constitutional, and practical considerations, that misdemeanor defendants having a right to counsel at trial should,
if their conviction is unappealable, also have a right to counsel in seeking a writ of review to the Louisiana Supreme
Court. However, until statutory or jurisprudential action is
taken, these criminal defendants may continue to face the
situation of having access to an important and complex legal
procedure without the aid of counsel to adequately implement
41
that right.
Jerry Glen Jones

STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE BUSINESSES:
A MORE LIBERAL TREND

Plaintiff, an interstate carrier of petroleum products,
sued to recover taxes paid under the Louisiana corporation
franchise tax,' challenging the tax as an unconstitutional
levy on the privilege of doing interstate business. Plaintiff
owns and operates over two hundred fifty miles of pipeline
REV. 783 (1961). The need for counsel to insure an effective application for
review has already been recognized at the federal level. FED. R. CRIM. P.
44(a). See also Note, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 587-88 (1974).
41. For a further examination of indigent defendants in Louisiana, see
Erickson, The Standards of CriminalJustice in a Nutshell, 32 LA. L. REV. 369
(1972); Powell, Extending Legal Services to Indigents and Low Income Groups,
13 LA. BAR J. 11 (1965); Slovenko, Representationfor Indigent Defendants, 33
TUL. L. REV. 363; Smith, Indigent Representation by Law Students: Forum

Juridicum, 30 LA. L. REV. 476 (1970); Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 740 (1973); Note, 33
LA. L. REV. 731 (1973); Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 446 (1973); Note, 16 LOY. L. REV.
495, 496-97 (1969-70).
1. LA. R.S. 47:601 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 325, § 1,
provides in pertinent part: "Every domestic corporation and every foreign
corporation, exercising its charter, or qualified to do business or actually
doing business in this state ....

shall pay an annual tax ...

on any one or all

of the following alternative incidents: (1) The qualification to carry on or do
business in this state or the actual doing of business within this state in a
corporate form. The term 'doing business' as used herein shall mean and
include each and every act, power, right, privilege, or immunity exercised or
enjoyed in this state, as an incident to or by virtue of the powers and
privileges acquired by the nature of such organizations, as well as the buying, selling or procuring of services or property. (2) The exercising of a
corporation's charter or the continuance of its charter within this state. (3)
The owning or using any part or all of its capital, plant or other property in
this state in a corporate capacity."
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within Louisiana but is engaged exclusively in interstate
business, having no administrative offices in Louisiana and
neither buying nor selling products in the state. The franchise tax was imposed upon plaintiff for its voluntary qualification to do business in the state in a corporate form. Finding the tax to have been levied on the local incident of doing
business in a corporate form and not on interstate commerce
itself, the United States Supreme Court held the tax a constitutionally permissible exaction for the benefits and protections afforded plaintiff's local activities in the corporate form.
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).2
The commerce clause of the Federal Constitution grants
to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce... among the
several States .... -3 Although the clause, on its face, is only
an affirmative grant to Congress of the power to regulate
interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court early
decided that it was also a tacit restriction on state regulation. 4 Since taxation is a form of regulation, 5 the commerce
clause is also considered a restriction on the exercise of the
taxation power by the states;6 nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has long recognized that not all state taxation of in7
terstate business is prohibited.
In distinguishing between prohibited and permitted taxes, the United States Supreme Court has used various approaches over the years and has demonstrated considerable
inconsistency in reasoning.8 Initially, the Court had a rigid
attitude toward all state taxation of interstate business,
2. The jurisprudence in the area of state taxation of multi-state businesses is extensive. This note focuses on the United States Supreme Court's
treatment of the subject.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. Reading R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 US. 232, 276 (1872) (commerce
clause prevents states from interfering with the privilege to carry on interstate business).
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
6. See Reading R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. 232 (1872) (state tax that
constituted a burden on or regulation of interstate commerce was contrary to
the power granted Congress, and, therefore, unconstitutional).
7. E.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938)
(upholding state tax on multi-state advertising business); Southern National
Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937) (upholding state franchise tax on
interstate carrier of petroleum products).
8. For a general discussion of approaches used by the Supreme Court in
this area, see J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 163-69 (3d ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as HELLERSTEIN].
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reasoning that states may not tax a privilege granted by the
federal government.9 However, as states' income needs grew
and multi-state businesses increased in number, the Court
became more willing to examine each specific tax instead of
laying down blanket restrictions. If a state tax was a direct
tax on interstate commerce, the Court found it unconstitutional, in line with its earlier reasoning that a state cannot
tax a privilege granted by the federal government; 10 however,
if the tax was indirect, i.e., levied on a local incident, it was
not prohibited. 1
Concentration on the practical effect or burden on interstate commerce of even an indirect tax has overshadowed
the direct-indirect test. If a state tax does not create an
undue burden on interstate commerce, it will generally be
upheld against a commerce clause challenge. 12 A court examining the disputed tax will usually focus on three requirements. First, a state must not impose a tax that discriminates
against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce.13 Second, a state may tax only those activities that are
9. Reading R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. 232 (1872); HELLERSTEIN
at 164.
10. E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389
(1952) (state tax on the privilege of soliciting interstate business unconstitutional); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (tax on
truckers found to be engaged only in interstate commerce invalid); Alpha
Portland Cement v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925) (excise tax on foreign
corporations doing exclusively interstate business invalid); Galveston H. & S.
Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908) (tax on railroads' gross receipts which
included receipts from interstate activities unconstitutional).
11. E.g., Stone v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 103 F.2d 544 (5th Cir.), aff'd,
308 U.S. 522 (1939) (upholding franchise tax levied on incidents of business
carried on within state by foreign corporations); Southern Natural Gas Corp.
v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937) (upholding franchise tax, apportioned to
corporation's capital within state, on the doing of local business); HELLERSTEIN at 165.
12. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 461 (1959) (upholding state income tax on foreign corporations,
finding no "undue burden" placed on the business); Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949) (upholding Louisiana tax on freight
carrier, finding no "cumulative effect" on the interstate commerce).
13. E.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389
(1952); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (tax on soliciting
business placed a heavier burden on interstate than on intrastate businesses); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940) (tax unconstitutional because
it levied a higher payment on out-of-state merchants than on local ones);
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875) (holding invalid a tax on peddling products made out-of-state but not on peddling those made locally).
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located within the taxing state; therefore, the state must
fairly apportion the measure of its tax. 14 Third, a state may
tax only those local incidents having such a nexus with the
taxing state that the possibility of multiple taxation of the
same incident by several states is precluded 15 and the tax will
be a fair exaction only for benefits and protections provided
by the taxing state. 6
The trend toward a liberal treatment of state taxes that
do not, as a practical matter, unduly burden interstate business was evident in 1948 when in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Stone' 7 the Supreme Court upheld a tax similar to the
Louisiana corporation franchise tax. The Mississippi tax in
question in Memphis was a franchise tax levied on corporations doing business within Mississippi and was measured by
the amount of capital used in the state, for which the state
gave "the benefit and protection of the government and laws
of the state."' 8 The Mississippi statute further defined "doing
business" as including every activity or benefit exercised or
enjoyed in the state by reason of the corporate form.' 9 The
14. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952) (nonapportioned tax on river traffic unconstitutional) with Ott v. Mississippi
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949) (Louisiana tax on barge traffic measured
by the number of miles traveled within the state as compared with the
number of miles traveled in entirety, constitutional).
15. E.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450 (1959) (upholding income tax fairly apportioned to foreign corporation's business activities within the state); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.
v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954) (holding unconstitutional a tax on the gathering of gas intended for shipment out of state); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v.
Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) (upholding franchise tax fairly apportioned on basis
of capital within state); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947)
(holding invalid a tax on stevedoring because loading and unloading are
separable sections of interstate commerce, taxable by both the state of origin
and that of destination); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250 (1938) (upholding tax on gross receipts from advertising sales within
state).
16. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 441 (1964)
(upholding tax on wholesale businesses, stating that "the question is
whether the State has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant's
activities within the State and to appellant's consequent enjoyment of the
opportunities and protections which the State has afforded"); Wisconsin v. J.
C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940) (Court held valid state tax on
corporate earnings, finding that the state gave in return the "substantial
privilege of carrying on business").
17. 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
18. Miss. Code § 9314 (1942).
19. Id. § 9312 (1942).
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Court found that the tax in Memphis was levied on a local
incident, the maintenance of one hundred thirty-five miles of
pipeline within the state, 20 and that the state in return gaveappellant the protection of its laws in carrying on such ac21
tivities.
However, that a tax does not place an undue burden on
interstate commerce does not of itself render the tax constitutionally valid. For example, in Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. O'Connor22 a tax was struck down because it was not
levied on a local incident; the challenged tax purported to be
levied merely on "the privilege of carrying on or doing business." 23 Making only a passing reference to Memphis, the
United States Supreme Court distinguished that case on the
ground that the Memphis tax was on an activity that was
"local in nature." 24 Much of the Spector decision was devoted
to an explanation of the separation of taxing powers between
the states and the federal government. 25 The Court pointed
out that in the commerce clause the states gave Congress the
exclusive power to tax the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce 26 and concluded its opinion by stating that "there
is not only reason but long-established precedent for keeping
the federal privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate
'27
commerce free from state taxation.
The tax in Spector seems no more burdensome on interstate commerce than that upheld in Memphis. The only
significant distinction between the two taxes was the terminology used to describe their subjects. The Memphis tax
purported to tax corporations engaged in business;28 the
Spector tax purported to tax only the privilege of doing business. 2 9 The Court's emphasis on terminology was made
further evident in the Railway Express Agency cases, Railway 130 and Railway II,31 and again in the instant case. The
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
inafter
31.
inafter

Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 86 (1948).
Id. at 96.
340 U.S. 602 (1951).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 354(e) (Cum.Supp. 1937).
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 610 (1951).
Id. at 608-10.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 610.
Miss. Code § 9314 (1942).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 354(e) (Cum. Supp. 1937).
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) [herecited as Railway I].
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) [herecited as Railway II].
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state tax challenged in Railway I was levied on the privilege
of carrying on interstate business in the state 32 and was held
unconstitutional. 33 However, the Virginia legislature redrafted the law, and the new version was challenged in Railway II. The amended law provided for a franchise tax measured by gross receipts and did not purport to tax the
privilege of doing business. 3 4 In upholding the new tax, the
United States Supreme Court in Railway II stated that a
state legislature cannot make an unconstitutional tax valid
by changing the words used, but can make a constitutional
35
tax invalid by choosing the wrong words.
In the instant case, the United States Supreme Court
accepted the Louisiana Supreme Court's reasoning that the
Louisiana franchise tax relates to a corporation's local activities and that the state provides benefits and protections 36
for those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair
return.3 7 In reconciling its decisions with Spectbr and Railway
I, the Court emphasized that the Louisiana legislature rephrased the franchise tax law in 1970, repealing an unconstitutional basis for the tax 38 and substituting another basis,
thereby making the law "constitutional by limiting its application to operating incidences of activities within Louisiana
for which the State affords privileges and protections.... " 39
32. Va. Code § 58-546-47 (1950).
33. Railway I at 369.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-546 (1950) as amended by VA. ACTS 1956, ch. 612:
"Each express company doing business in this State shall, on or before the
first day of June of each year, pay to the State a franchise tax which shall be
in lieu of taxes upon all of its other intangible property and in lieu of
property taxes on its rolling stock."
35. Railway II at 441. The Court cites Railway I and Spector as authority. For a further treatment of the Railway Express cases and Spector, see
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Roadway Express, the
Diminishing Privilege Tax Immunity, and the Movement Toward Uniformity
in Apportionment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 186 (1968); Marsh, Interstate Commerce:
State Taxation of Motor Carriers, 41 A.B.A.J. 603 (1955).
36. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Agerton, 289 So. 2d 93, 100 (La. 1974). Such
benefits include the right to sue and be sued, continuity of business, the right
to transfer property by stock disposition, advantages due to control by corporate directors, and the absence of individual liability.
37. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 109 (1975).
38. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mouton, 228 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 231 So. 2d 393 (1970) (LA. R.S. 47:601, as amended by La. Acts
1958, No. 437, § 2 held unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff). Section 601
then provided that the tax "is due and payable for the privilege of carrying
on or doing business .... "
39. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 113 (1975).
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Whereas the taxes in Spector and Railway I were levied expressly on the privilege of doing interstate business, the
Louisiana tax is levied on a local activity, the qualification to
40
do business in the corporate form.
The dissent in Colonial Pipeline criticized the majority's
distinction between taxing interstate commerce and taxing
the form in which it is conducted. It failed to find a consistency between the instant case and prior decisions and
suggested that if the Court upheld the instant tax, it would
be more reasonable to overrule the decisions in Spector and

Railway

1.41

42
Although the precedents in the area are inconsistent, if
the prior cases are viewed in light of the purposes of the
commerce clause, a definite pattern emerges. On a practical
level, the commerce clause was designed partly to fulfill the
need for free trade on a national level, unfettered by burdensome state regulation.43 As interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the clause has fulfilled this need by requiring that
state taxes bearing upon interstate commerce be nondiscriminatory, 44 fairly apportioned, 45 and sufficiently related
to local activities for which the state provides benefits in
46
return.
However, conformity with the Court's three-factor test is
not enough to satisfy constitutional requirements. An examination of the federal-state implications of the commerce
clause should make the reason for the insufficiency obvious;
not only was the commerce clause intended as a restriction on

40. Id. at 112-14.
41. "I could understand if the Court today were forthrightly to overrule
these precedents and hold that a state franchise tax upon interstate commerce is constitutionally valid, so long as it is not discriminatory." Id. at 116
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion shared some of the dissent's
views and also pointed out the obvious inconsistences among precedents. He
recognized the need for clear guidelines in the area of state taxation of
interstate commerce and suggested that "a state franchise tax that does not
threaten interstate commerce by being discriminatory, or unfairly apportioned, or devoid of sufficient nexus, passes constitutional muster under the
Commerce Clause and may be imposed in the absence of Congressional proscription." Id. at 114-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
43. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440 (1963);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943).
44. See cases cited in note 13, supra.
45. See cases cited in note 14, supra.
46. See cases cited in notes 15 & 16, supra.
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the power of the states to burden interstate commerce, it is
primarily a grant of power to Congress. 47 As pointed out in
the Spector decision, the commerce clause gives Congress the
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, and its
power must be kept free from state interference. 48 If a state is
allowed to tax interstate commerce, by implication it may
control and eventually destroy it, for the power to tax is the
power to control and destroy. 49 Thus, although the Spector
tax was not likely to burden interstate commerce to a greater
extent than the tax challenged in the instant case, the Spector tax was apparently objectionable because, by claiming to
tax the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, the tax
suggested that the state could exercise control over interstate commerce. The tax in the instant case does not run
afoul of the commerce clause because it does not purport to
tax the privilege of doing interstate business, and thus does
not suggest state control of that federal privilege. Although
the distinction between taxing the privilege of doing business
and taxing the form of doing business may make "no practical
sense," 50 it does make "constitutional sense."' 51 In our federal
system, the power to regulate interstate commerce belongs
exclusively to Congress, and the states may not share in that
control.
The decision in the instant case has clarified the Supreme
Court's position. Although the Court has shown a liberal attitude toward state taxes that bear upon but do not burden
multi-state businesses unfairly, it has shown a strict adherence to the tenet that states may not reach, or at least purport to reach, the forbidden fruit of interstate commerce.
Thus, a four factor test emerges: a state tax statute which
burdens interstate commerce must be non-discriminatory, be
fairly apportioned, demonstrate a sufficient nexus to local
activity and return, and be worded in such a manner that it
does not purport to tax the privilege itself of carrying on
interstate business.
The last restriction is, in fact, little more than a phantom.
The decisions in Spector, Railway I and II, and the instant
47. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608 (1951).
48. Id. at 608-10; Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 (1946).
49. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 424 (1946); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 431 (1819).
50. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 115 (1974) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
51. Id.
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case seem to indicate that a state legislature can make an
otherwise unconstitutional tax constitutional by rephrasing a
statute so that it purports to tax a local incident, such as the
form of doing business, rather than the privilege of doing
interstate business. This distinction is, however, justified as a
means of safeguarding the federal-state taxing dichotomy
created by the commerce clause, as construed by the United
States Supreme Court.
Judy F. Pierce

CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF
ACTIO DE IN REM VERSO

Defendant, A-Second Mortgage Co., which held a second
mortgage on the plaintiff's property, agreed to accept the
property in full settlement of its claim and to pay the plaintiffs first mortgage notes on the property as they matured.'
A-Second was relieved of the additional obligation when the
first mortgage was satisfied from proceeds of a life insurance
policy which the plaintiff had previously purchased from and
assigned to the first mortgagee. Realizing that she had lost
both the insurance proceeds and the property, plaintiff sued
the first and second mortgagees for recovery of the amount of
insurance proceeds applied to the first mortgage. Reversing
the First Circuit Court of Appeal, 2 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that A-Second had been unjustifiably enriched and
that the plaintiff could recover the sum on the basis of an
actio de in rem verso. 3 Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co.,
289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
1. Whether A-Second legally assumed the mortgage was never determined. The trial court judge stated that such a determination was not material to the ultimate issues in dispute. Trial Record, 22d J.D.C., Parish of St.
Tammany, #28,064 at 106 (Wallace A. Edwards Div. "B"; June 9, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Trial Record].
2. Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co., 273 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973).
3. The actio de in rem verso derives from Roman law, which provided the
action for the recovery of necessary expenses incurred by a slave, as an
unauthorized agent, for the benefit of his master. W. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC
AND HISTORICAL EXPOSITION OF ROMAN LAW IN THE ORDER OF A CODE 616

(3d ed. 1897) [hereinafter cited as HUNTER].

